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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties are: (a)Donald Rawlings ("Donald") and his spouse Jeanette Rawlings
("Jeanette"); (b) Arnold Dwayne Rawlings ("Dwayne") and his spouse Paulette
Rawlings ("Paulette"), individually and as Trustees of the Arnold Dwayne Rawlings
Family Trust; and (c) Theron LaRell Rawlings ("LaRell"), Bryce C. Rawlings ("Bryce")
and Carol Lynn R. Masterson ("Carol"). Donald, Dwyane, LaRell, Bruce and Carol aife
siblings and their parents are Arnold J. Rawlings ("Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings ("Cleo").
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Court of Appeals5 Opinion
The Court of Appeals' opinion is set forth as: Rowlings v. Rowlings, 2008 UT App
478 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Date of Entry of Decision
The Court of Appeals' decision was issued on December 26, 2008.
Statutory Jurisdictional Provision
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a
constructive trust.
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness. 'The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review.'" State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230, 232 (Utah 2002).
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules, and Regulations
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal issues
present in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The court is being asked to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which
reversed the District Court's decision imposing a constructive trust on property described
in a deed dated signed by Arnold J. Rawlings and Cleo Rawlings dated March 24, 1967,
listing Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings as grantees. Arnold was the sole owner of
the property and intended only to make a temporary transfer, with Arnold's remaining
children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the trust property. (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact | 57). The issue is whether the March 24,
1967 deed would allow the district court to properly impose a constructive trust as an
equitable remedy pursuant to Utah case law, Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 or
Restatement of Restitution §160.
Course Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts
The case was tried to the bench trial, where the trial court ruled in favor of
Dwayne, LaRell, Bryce, and Carol, imposing a constructive trust on the property
conveyed to Donald and Jeanette in the 1967 and 1974 deeds.
Donald and Jeanette appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and the case was poured
over to the Court of Appeals. The matter was argued before the Court of Appeals on
August 21, 2008. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on December 26, 2008,
reversing the District Court's judgment finding that a constructive trust was established,
and reversing the District Court's order awarding sanctions against Donald and Jeanette
for failing to engage in good faith participation in Court ordered mediation. Dwayne and
2

Paulette now ask this Court to correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling on the
reversal of the imposition of a constructive trust.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arnold J. Rawlings (Arnold) and Cleo Rawlings (Cleo) had five children who are,
in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (Donald), Arnold Dwayne Rawlings (Dwayne),
Theron LaRell Rawlings (LaRell), Bryce C. Rawlings (Bryce), and Carol Rawlings
Masterson (Carol). (Findings of Fact f 1). In 1944, Arnold purchased property from his
mother, Gertrude Rawlings, and obtained the deed to the property (the "trust property").
(R. 1587, Trans. Vol. I, 31:19-25). Cleo has never had title in the trust property. (Findings
of Fact f 2). Arnold sold 12 acres of his approximately 22.37 acres of the trust property,
leaving approximately 10.37 acres. (Findings of Fact f3). Thereafter, Arnold and his
family used the trust property to grow and sell produce; Arnold also kept on the trust
property the horses he and his family broke. (R. 1587, Trans. Vol. I, 39:7-18).
In 1962, Arnold deeded property roughly adjacent to Arnold's home to Dwayne
and spouse on which they built a home. (Findings of Fact ^[4). In 1967 a very small piece
was deeded to Dwayne and spouse by Arnold between the properties where Arnold's
home was and where Dwayne and spouse built their home. Id. In 1960, Arnold deeded to
Donald and spouse a property slightly to the west of the property deeded to Dwayne. Id.
Donald built his home on that property. Id. In 1964, Arnold deeded in 1964 property to
Donald adjacent to Donald's home which has been referred to as the barn property. Id. In
1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of Dwayne's home
("the garden") and the other south of the bam property ("the orchard"). Id.
3

In 1963, Arnold's remaining interest in the property ("the trust property") was
pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed (Findings of Fact ^| 5, Trial
Exhibit 8). In 1964, that indebtedness was rewritten as a conditional sales contract with
the pledge of a Ford truck and an Oldsmobile automobile. (Findings of Fact f 6). The
transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the replacement of security.
(Findings of Fact f 7).
By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately
required medical attention. (Findings of Fact f 8). Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald
talked to the Utah County Department of Public Welfare (Welfare Department) about his
intention to have his father transfer the trust property to him. (Findings of Fact f 9). That
intent was corroborated by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department referring to a
prior meeting, and providing proof of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of
the Walker Bank debt. (Findings of Fact If 9, Trial Exhibit 86). On December 22, 1966,
Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, following which he labored
to recover from his illness. (Findings of Fact If 10). In January of 1967, Arnold began the
series of 20 cobalt treatments. (Findings of Fact f 11). The medical attention that Arnold
required was extremely expensive. Id. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the medical
treatment and received welfare assistance. Id. Arnold's health steadily deteriorated, and
he was in very poor health in 1966 and 1967. (Findings of Fact f 16; R. 1588 Trans. Vol.
II, 244:15-19, R. 1590 Trans. Vol. IV, 629:17-22, 632:14-15.) In March of 1967, Arnold
was somewhat advanced in age, had an eighth grade or less education, and was very
concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare Department. (Findings of
4

Fact If 16; R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 48:21-24, 132:17-19,225:11-20). The Welfare
Department would pay the majority of the medical expenses associated with Arnold's
illness if Arnold's property (other than his home) was not in his name. (Findings of Fact ^
14). He was advised by the Welfare Department to transfer the trust property out of his
name. (Trial Exhibit 68). Arnold told LaRell that Arnold needed to get the trust property
out of his name and suggested that he deed it to LaRell. (Findings of Fact ^[43, R. 1587
Trans. Vol. I, 48:13-19). LaRell testified that he didn't want the responsibility and
suggested that Arnold put the land in Dwayne's name because Dwayne would be the
most fair to the family. (Findings of Fact ^[44, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. 149:8-11). Arnold
indicated to LaRell that he thought LaRell's suggestion to put the land in Dwayne's name
was a good idea. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. 149:11-12).
However, Arnold later requested a meeting at a restaurant in Salt Lake with
Donald and LaRell. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I. 49:13-23). LaRell testified that Arnold met
him in the parking lot of the restaurant and informed him that "Donald's really upset"
"because he's the oldest, and he thinks [the trust property] should be put in his name." (R.
1587 Trans. Vol. I 49:24-25, 50:1-3). LaRell testified that Arnold then stated to LaRell
that putting the land in Donald's name was the "same deal" as when they had discussed
putting the land in Dwayne's name. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 50:5-10). LaRell understood
from Arnold that Arnold thought the trust property would come back to him when he got
better, and, if Arnold didn't recover, then it would first go to take care of Cleo and then to
the rest of the family. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 50:14-18). At the meeting between Donald,
Arnold, and LaRell, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald
5

because of the Welfare requirement for receiving assistance—Arnold did not mention the
Walker Bank debt as a reason for deeding the trust property to Donald. (Findings of Fact
fflf 45, 46, 47; R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 51:1-3).
In January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on
the trust property; Dwayne borrowed $1,000 from the credit union at Geneva Steel and
endorsed that check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxes which
Donald alleged were due on the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 50). Donald did not
deliver this $1000 to the Utah County Assessor for payment of real estate taxes until after
the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold. Id. One or two days before
March 24, 1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald and Arnold met with
Dwayne, and Arnold informed Dwayne that Arnold was deeding the trust property to
Donald because Arnold needed to get the trust property out of his name, consistent with
other concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer
had anything to do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt. (Findings of
Fact f48). On March 24, 1967, Donald and spouse caused a total of $1,267 ($1,000 of
which was paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office on the trust
property and on properties owned by Donald and spouse. (Findings of Fact f 52).
Dwayne testified that during a conversation with Donald present, Arnold disclosed that
he was putting the trust property in Donald's name to be held for the family and divided
later. (R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II 336:1-2, 381: 8-15).
Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded with the Utah County Recorder
on March 24, 1967, Arnold deeded the trust property to Donald and Jeanette. (Findings of
6

Fact f 17, Trial Exhibit 12). Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal
description. Id. Although Cleo's signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership
interest in the trust property, and there was no testimony given as to why she executed
any deed that was offered into evidence in this manner. Id. The same day, a quit-claim
deed ("the sibling deed") was signed by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol,
and Bryce in favor of Donald and Jeanette. (Findings of Fact f 19). Bryce testified that he
was told by Arnold before he signed the deed that the welfare treatments were the reason
the trust property needed to be transferred, and that the transfer was temporary—meaning
that the trust property would be returned to Arnold when Arnold got better. (R. 1588
Trans. Vol. II 225:11-20,245:21-25). LaRell testified that when he went to sign the deed,
Arnold explicitly told him (without prompting) that the trust property was not Donald's;
it was the family's property. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 60:9-12, Findings of Fact ^J 53).
Plaintiffs did not produce any persuasive testimony contradicting the testimony of Carol,
Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject. (Findings of Fact f 54).
After the deeds were signed in March 1967, Arnold's routine in running the
farming and livestock operations on the trust property remained the same. (R. 1587
Trans. Vol. I 63:19-23; R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II 229:23-25; 281:11-21). Bryce testified that
his father signed the March 24, 1967, deed to Donald and spouse intending only to make
it a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the
trust property. (Findings of Fact % 57). Arnold continued to refer to the trust property as
"his," and he considered the trust property to be his up until the time of his death.
(Findings of Fact % 56, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 233:24-25; 234:1; 253:1-22; 339:16-22).
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After the signing of the deed, Arnold gave permission to Bryce to live on the trust
property and picked a spot for him to put his mobile home. (R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II,
235:18-21). In 1970, Arnold requested that the military discharge his son LaRell early so
that he could come help Arnold on the trust property. (Findings of Fact ^f 58). Several
letters addressed to the military from Arnold and various other individuals in the
community referred the trust property as Arnold's farm, with no mention of Donald
owning the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 58, Trial Exhibits 19-29).
On March 1,1971, Arnold died. (Findings of Fact |65). On March 30, 1971,
Arnold's widow paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which included all of the trust property.
(Findings of Fact | 67). After Arnold's death, most of the family members except Donald
continued to work on the trust property. (Findings of Fact f20, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I,
66:3-8); R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 254:8-10). When asked about who worked on the trust
property, Donald testified, "all I (Donald) know is that I didn't." (Findings of Fact f 20,
75).
After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that the
income from the trust property was being used to support their widowed mother.
(Findings of Fact f 22, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 238:11-12). In 1974, the Vineyard
Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south boundary line of the trust
property (see Trial Exhibit 1). (Findings of Fact f 24, 70, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 401:12). As it was developed, fences were place in the backyards of the homes in Vineyard
meadows Subdivision, generally near the south boundary line of the trust property.
Donald told Dwayne that the fences in those backyards encroached upon "Mother's
8

farm." Id. At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm/'
Dwayne and his son worked with Donald and his son to place a fence through the
backyards of the home owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for
"Mother's farm" was. Id. Dwayne regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saint ward with the people who lived in those homes. Id. He and his spouse were
friends with those home owners. Nevertheless, the undisputed testimony is, in order to
assist in the protection of the trust property, Dwayne and his son placed fencing in those
yards. Ultimately, the litigation surrounding the boundary dispute was resolved. Donald
caused some of the funds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings (LaRell
refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support. Id. This included
the purchase of a car. Id. As part of the Vineyard Meadows lawsuit, Donald persuaded
his siblings to sign a deed naming Donald and Jeanette as grantees, which Donald
explained contained a legal description only of the disputed area. (Findings of Fact 125,
72, Trial Exhibit 30, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 104:1-4). In fact, it contained a legal
description that included all of the trust property. (Findings of Fact f25, Trial Exhibit 30).
The Vineyard Meadows lawsuit was settled, and Donald gave some of the funds to his
siblings and used some to support his mother. (Findings of Fact f 24, 71). Donald then
co-mingled the remainder of the settlement money with his own money, along with the
trust property proceeds not used for his mother. (Finding of Fact f 76, R. 1589 Trans.
Vol. Ill, 579:2-24). The testimony is undisputed that Donald is unable to distinguish any
funds which he spend at any time from March 24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their
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source whether they came from the trust property incomfe or from income from some
other source. (Findings of Fact % 76).
Until 1993, less than four (4) years before this suit was filed, the family members
believed that the trust property was held for the family and that Donald considered it to
be the trust property until a conversation in which Donald told Dwayne that the land was
his (Donald's) property and that he wasn't compensating their mother for anything he
used from the property. (Findings of Fact f 74, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 3556:12-20).
Donald and Jeanette maintain that they were deeded the trust property by Arnold
because they paid an alleged indebtedness for him. (Findings of Fact | 39-40). Donald
and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to the Walker Bank on December 29, 1966 to
pay off Arnold's indebtedness and save the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 27). The
conditional contract which Donald and Jeanette assert they paid off was marked paid on
December 15, 1966 and altered by ink to show a date of December 29, 1966. (Findings of
Fact f 28-29). As set forth above, Arnold's surgery was on December 22,1966. The bank
had a security interest in a Ford truck and Oldsmobile which could have been foreclosed
and taken in satisfaction of remaining debt. (Findings of Fact f 31). If a foreclosure of the
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait
90 days for the debtors to cure the default before Notice of Sale could have been
published. Id. No such recording was every produced and is not a record in the Utah
County Recorder's Office. Id. No evidence was presented that the check for $579.06 was
the required loan payoff amount. (Findings of Fact 132). Jeanette testified that she and
Donald had their own indebtedness with Walker Bank and Trust Company for the
10

building of their home at the same time period. (Findings of Fact f 33). Donald and
Jeanette's banking records offered into evidence during the trial revealed no other
payments to Walker Bank during the time frame, in spite of Jeanette's uncontroverted
testimony that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been
made with Walker Bank and Trust during that time frame. (Findings of Fact ^f 35). The
deeding of the trust property to Donald and Jeanette occurred on March 24, 1967—some
three months after the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs. (Findings
of Fact f 37). After the litigation commenced, Jeanette altered the checks evidencing
payments to Walker Bank and Trust Company by adding language on each of them to
indicate they were paid to Walker Bank and Trust Company for and in behalf of Arnold
Rawlings. (Findings of Fact ^f 38). It was only during the May 9,2005, deposition of
Jeanette that she admitted to the alteration of the documentary evidence, by notations
made after this suit was filed, for the purpose of designating those checks as checks paid
on Arnold Rawlings' account. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should hold the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's
imposition of a constructive trust because the district court could properly impose a
constructive trust under either Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 or Restatement of
Restitution §160.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts allows for the imposition of a constructive
trust for a third party if the grantor and grantee were in a confidential relationship at the
11

time of the transaction and the grantor did not intend to transfer both legal and equitable
title to the grantee. Arnold had the intent to split the legal and equitable title as required
by Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45. The transferor need not extract a promise from
the transferee to hold the property in trust in order for the court to properly find that the
property was transferred with the intent to create a trust. In determining whether or not to
institute a constructive trust, the court should look at the situation sensibly and broadly
with all human implications. As a result, although no evidence was presented that Donald
entered into an express promise to hold the property in trust for Arnold, the court may
still properly impose a constructive trust.
Individual findings of fact by the district court should not be taken out of context
but should be viewed in context with the case as a whole. The Court of Appeals
erroneously took paragraph 62 of the District Court's findings of fact out of context and
interpreting, "Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership
rights in the [trust property]" to mean that Arnold did not intend to transfer the property
at all. However, when taken in context with the rest of the findings of fact, the statement
simply means that Arnold intended to transfer legal, but not equitable, title to the property
and did not intend to make Donald and Jeanette the owners of the trust property in their
personal capacities.
Arnold was in a confidential relationship with Donald at the time that Arnold
transferred legal title of the trust property into Donald's name. A formal confidential
relationship need not exist between the transferor and transferee; the superiority of one
party and dependence, trust and reliance of the other are the important factors. Although a
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parent-child relationship alone is not enough to create a confidential relationship, a
family relationship characterized such that the transferor is justified in believing that the
transferee will act in his interest is enough to create a confidential relationship which will
satisfy the requirement of Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45. The transferee does not
have to be guilty of undue influence, intentional fraud or other abuse of his confidential
relationship with the transferor for a constructive trust to be imposed. When the
constructive trust was created, Arnold was sick and mentally distressed at the thought of
losing the trust property, there was a great age disparity between Arnold and Donald as
well as a parent/child relationship. Arnold was justified in believing that Donald would
act in Arnold's best interests in his actions regarding the 1967 conveyance. According to
Utah law they were in a confidential relationship. Even if Donald was not guilty of undue
influence in getting Arnold to transfer title of the land to him, the court could still
properly impose a constructive trust because of the confidential relationship that existed
between Arnold and Donald. Because Arnold had the necessary intent to split the legal
and equitable title to his property when he conveyed the land to Donald in 1967 and
Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at the time of the conveyance, this
Court should find that the Court of Appeals' reversal of the constructive trust imposed by
the district court was improper under Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45.
Restatement of Restitution §160
This court should uphold the District Court's imposition of a constructive trust on
the trust property because Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were to
retain the title of the property without the imposition of a constructive trust. The
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Restatement of Restitution §160 declares that a constructive trust arises if the person
holding the title to the property would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain
it. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, and the court
has broad discretion in how it applies this remedy; the court is "bound by no unyielding
formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction
wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in unjust
enrichment." A constructive trust, unlike other types of trusts, does not require a
manifestation of intent to create a trust and may be imposed by law regardless of the
intention of the parties or legal title. When determining whether a constructive trust is the
proper equitable remedy, the totality of circumstances and setting will be taken into
account.
Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to retain the
title to the trust property because the trust property's success over the years has been a
product of the family effort where everyone except Donald has worked on the trust
property to keep it running and maintain the land. Even if the court does not think that
Arnold had the necessary intent to satisfy Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45, the court
can still impose a constructive trust under Restatement of Restitution §160 to prevent
unjust enrichment. Since the constructive trust was proper under either or both of these
theories, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a
constructive trust.
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ARGUMENT
I. This Court should hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District
Court's imposition of a constructive trust because Utah law supports the
imposition of a constructive trust in this case under either the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §45 or the Restatement of Restitution §160This Court should hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district
court's imposition of a constructive trust on the trust property to which Donald holds the
title. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts allows for the imposition of a constructive trust
for a third party if the grantor and grantee were in a confidential relationship at the time
of the transaction. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45. Since Donald and Arnold were in
a confidential relationship when the 1967conveyance occurred, the district court's
imposition of the constructive trust was proper under § 45 of the Restatement of Trusts.
In addition, the Restatement of Restitution §160 instructs the court to impose a
constructive trust whenever a party would be unjustly enriched by retaining property to
which he has legal title. Donald would be unjustly enriched by retaining the title to the
trust property without a constructive trust. Under either the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts or the Restatement of Restitution, the district court's decision to impose a
constructive trust was correct.
A. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the imposition of a constructive trust on the
trust property under Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 because Arnold, the
transferor, had both the intent to split the legal and equitable title and a
confidential relationship with Donald, the transferee.
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Under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which this Court has applied in
previous constructive trust cases, the district court correctly imposed a constructive trust
on the trust property. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(1) reads as follows:
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to another in
trust for a third person, but no memorandum property evidencing the
intention to create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds,
and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds the
interest upon a constructive trust for the third person, if, but only if
a) The transferee by fraud, duress or undue influence prevented the
transferor from creating an enforceable interest in the third person, or
b) The transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to
the transferor, or
c) The transfer was made by the transferor in anticipation of death.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(1).
No writing evidenced Arnold's intent to transfer title to Donald and Jeanette in
trust. The evidence does show that Arnold had the intent to split the legal and equitable
title to the trast property and that Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at
the time of the transfer. Therefore, the imposition of a constructive trust by the district
court was proper.
i. Arnold had the intent to split the legal and equitable title as required by Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §45.
Arnold intended to split legal and equitable title when he made the 1967
conveyance of property to Donald and Jeanette. The transferor need not extract a promise
from the transferee to hold the property in trust in order for the court to properly find that
the property was transferred with the intent to create a trust. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d
229, 232 (Utah 1949); Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255, 258; Wood v.
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Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 91,118 N. E. 214. In Haws v. Jensen, the Utah
Supreme Court was examining an argument made by the defendant that the constructive
trust imposed by the lower court was inappropriate because the plaintiffs complaint had
not contained an allegation "that the grantee made a promise to the grantor to hold the
property in trust as a condition of the conveyance of the property to [the grantee]." 209
P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949). To support its imposition of a constructive trust, the Utah
Supreme Court cited a New York case where a constructive trust was found despite the
absence of an express promise to hold the property in trust for the grantor:
In Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255, 258, the grantor, a court
clerk, owned an interest in certain real property. His ownership subjected
him to constant importunities to go bail for persons in trouble. In order to
escape these importunities, he executed a deed conveying his interest in the
property to his sister. After his death litigation arose as to whether the
conveyance had been made in trust for him. Said the New York Court of
Appeals, speaking through Justice Cardozo, "Even if we were to accept her
[the sister's] statement that there was no distinct promise to hold it for his
[the grantor's] benefit, the exaction of such a promise, in view of the
relation, might well have seemed to be superfluous. Though a promise in
words was lacking, the whole transaction, it might be found, was 'instinct
with an obligation' imperfectly expressed. Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 91, 118 N. E. 214. It was to be interpreted, not
literally or irrespective of its setting, but sensibly and broadly with all
human implications."
Id
Like the Haws and Sinclair cases, no evidence in this case shows that Arnold
obtained an express promise from Donald that Donald would hold the property in trust
for his father instead of claiming the property for himself. However, as Justice Cardozo
stated, the transaction should be looked at "sensibly and broadly with all human
implications." Because of the nature of the relationship between the grantor and the
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grantee in this case—a sick, aging, and under-educated father and his healthy oldest
son—Arnold likely felt that the extraction of an express promise was unnecessary.
Arnold had expressed to multiple parties that the sole purpose of transferring the legal
title in the trust property to Donald and Jeanette was to retain County welfare payment of
medical expenses. In addition, because Arnold had previously discussed deeding title to
the trust property to both LaRell and Dwayne before deciding to transfer title to Donald,
Donald did not reasonably believe that the transfer was a gift making him and Jeanette
the owners of the trust property in their personal capacities with no obligation to hold it in
trust for Arnold.
In addition, individual findings of fact by the district court should not be taken out
of context but should be viewed in context with the case as a whole. Salt Lake City S.
R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm % 1999 UT 90, P7 (Utah 1999); Schmidt v. Utah State Tax
Comm % 1999 UT 48, P7 (Utah 1999); Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 560 (Utah Ct. App.
2003); Roadmaster (USA) Corp. v. Calmodal Freight Sys., 153 Fed. Appx. 827, 829 (3d
Cir. N.J. 2005); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,
976 F.2d 1559, 1567-1568 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Covey v. Covey, a brother appealed a
judgment in a suit brought against him by his sister for a breach of contract. Covey 80
P.3d at 555. The brother challenged the validity and consistency of three findings of fact
by the lower court. Id. The Court affirmed the consistency of the findings of fact and
reproved the brother for taking the findings of facts out of context:
The portions of the three challenged findings quoted in Almon's brief are
taken out of context and Almon's argument misapprehends the findings in
several instances. When read together in their entirety, the three findings
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are entirely consistent with one another. In addition, the three findings are
supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Id.
Similarly, in the Minnesota Mining case, a man disputed the findings of fact in a
patent suit. Minnesota Mining 976 F.2d at 1567-1568. The man alleged that some of the
findings of fact actually supported his position, which was contrary to the lower court's
holding. Id. The Court agreed that when taken out of context the findings did appear to
support his arguments, but rejected his reasoning, stating, "However, when the findings
are reviewed in context, their meaning is clear." Id.
The Court of Appeals, like the appellants in the Covey and Minnesota Mining
cases, took one finding of fact out of context and used it to support a premise contrary to
its original meaning. The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that the finding that
"Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the
farm," meant that "Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm at a l l . . . " Rowlings v.
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, P 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). When taken in context with
the other findings of fact, the undisputed testimony of witnesses, and other evidence at
trial, the Court of Appeals' reading of that particular finding of fact is obviously
incorrect.
Arnold clearly intended to transfer legal title in the trust property to Donald and
Jeanette with the 1967 deed. This intent was evidenced by Arnold's numerous
conversations with his children announcing his intent to transfer legal title in the trust
property, the deed itself, and the correspondence between the Welfare Department and
Donald about the intended transfer. Using the finding of fact in question, the district court
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attempted to clarify that Arnold did not intend to make Donald and Jeanette the owners of
the trust property in their personal capacities. In other words, Arnold did not intend to
transfer equitable title to the property to Donald and Jeanette when he deeded the trust
property to them in 1967.
Arnold's actions demonstrate that he believed that he still held equitable title to
the land even after signing the 1967 deed. Arnold continued to refer to the trust property
as "his" property in his written and oral communication until he died. Arnold had
conversations with LaRell, Bryce, and Dwayne about the trust property being the "family
farm," and indicated that Arnold expected the trust property would later be reconveyed to
him or divided among the family fairly. In addition, Arnold and his wife continued to pay
taxes and use the land in the same manner as before they transferred legal title to Donald
and Jeanette.
Both the evidence presented in the case and the other findings of fact show that the
Court of Appeals5 reading of that particular finding of fact was mistaken. Arnold did
intend to transfer legal title to Donald and Jeanette, but he did not intend to transfer
equitable title in the trust property through the 1967 deed. Because Arnold's actions, the
evidence presented at trial, and the other findings of fact show that Arnold did not intend
to make Donald and Jeanette the owners of the trust property in their personal capacities,
but instead intended for Donald to hold the property for him in trust, the Court should
find that Arnold had the intent to split legal and equitable title through the 1967
conveyance.
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ii. Arnold was in a confidential relationship with Donald at the time that Arnold
transferred legal title of the trust property into Donald's name.
Under the definition of a "confidential relationship" expressed in Utah case law,
Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance
of the trust property from Arnold to Donald. This confidential relationship allows the
court to properly find that Donald held the trust property in trust for his mother and
siblings. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45.
A formal confidential relationship need not exist between the transferor and
transferee; the superiority of one party and dependence, trust and reliance of the other
are the important factors in finding a confidential relationship. Hawkins v. Perry, 253
P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953); Newell v. Halloran, 68 Utah 407, 414 (Utah 1926). Hawkins
v. Perry is an example of a case where the court found that a constructive trust was
properly imposed upon land despite the lack of a formal confidential relationship
between the transferor and transferee. 253 P.2d at 377. In Hawkins, a nephew gave his
uncle money to purchase a house. Id. at 373. The uncle purchased the house and
promised to transfer the property to the nephew upon majority. Id. However, the uncle
subsequently divorced his wife and the property in question was awarded to her. Id. The
appellate court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust upon the property in favor
of the nephew although the confidential relationship was not a formal one. Id. at 376377. The court reasoned that: "If by reason of kinship, business association, disparity in
age, or physical or mental condition or other reason, [one party] is in an especially
intimate position with regard to the [other], and the latter reposes a high degree of trust
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and confidence in the former, the court may find that the relationship is technically
'confidential.'"/d. at 376 (citations omitted).
Although a parent-child relationship alone is not enough to create a confidential
relationship, a family relationship characterized such that the transferor is justified in
believing that the transferee will act in his interest is enough to create a confidential
relationship. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949); Bradbury v. Rasmussen,
401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965); Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); see also Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984); and Blodgett v.
Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978). This type of confidential relationship existed in
Haws v. Jensen. In Haws, a mother ("Mrs. Haws") executed a warranty deed in favor of
her daughter ("Amber") but continued to live on and use the property as her own until
her death some years later. After the death of Mrs. Haws, Amber and her husband
resided on the property. After Amber's death, her husband, as Amber's sole heir,
declared himself the owner of the property. Amber's siblings (and their heirs) brought
suit, claiming that the warranty deed was intended to create an oral trust with the land to
be held for the benefit of the entire family. The siblings did not expressly allege in their
complaint that Amber and Mrs. Haws were in a confidential relationship at the time of
the transfer. Id. at 217-218. In response to Amber's husband's argument that this lack of
an allegation in the complaint would preclude the court from finding a confidential
relationship, the Court gave the following statement:
The defendant contends that there is no allegation of a confidential relation
between Amber and Mrs. Haws. True, it is not specifically alleged that
there was a confidential relation. However, in the complaint it is alleged
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that Mrs. Haws conveyed the property to Amber intending that the latter
hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family. Implicit in this
allegation is that Mrs. Haws reposed confidence in Amber; otherwise, Mrs.
Haws would have not made the conveyance. Thus this allegation along with
the fact that the grantor and grantee were mother and daughter, which
appears on the face of the complaint, is a sufficient allegation of a
confidential relation.
Id.
The Haws Court then held that the confidential relationship between the mother
and daughter was sufficient to create a constructive trust under Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §45 without written evidence, despite the fact that the deed was absolute on its
face, and despite the fact that no express allegation of a confidential relationship was
raised in the complaint. Id. at 224. In response to the defendant's allegations that the
siblings had failed to prove by clear, unequivocal, and conclusive evidence that Amber
took the property subject to the condition that she hold and use it for her mother's heirs,
the Court responded that it would not set aside the trial court's findings on conflicting
evidence unless the findings clearly weighed against the evidence or the trial court
misapplied proven facts. Id. at 218-219.
The transferee does not have to be guilty of undue influence, intentional fraud or
other abuse of his confidential relationship with the transferor for a constructive trust to
be imposed. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 comment (c); Hawkins v. Perry, 253
P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1953); Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949). The court in
Haws v. Jensen reviewed the law of constructive trusts and discussed what constitutes an
abuse of a confidential relationship sufficient to justify imposition a constructive trust:
A constructive trust will be imposed even though at the time of the transfer
the transferee intended to perform the agreement, and even though he was
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not guilty of undue influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the
confidential relation consists merely in the failure of the transferee
to perform his promise. Scott on Trusts, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity
in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, but is
free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction
wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in
unjust enrichment. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1, 1946 Ed., §
471.
Id. at 231.
Although the father-son relationship between Arnold and Donald is not enough
alone to show that they were in a confidential relationship at the time of the conveyance,
other factors combine to show that Arnold and Donald had a confidential relationship
when Arnold transferred title in the trust property to Donald and Jeanette.
Like both the uncle in the Hawkins case and the daughter in the Haws case,
Donald was in a position of superiority to Arnold at the time of the conveyance, and
Arnold depended upon and trusted Donald. The court in Hawkins listed several factors
and stated that the presence of any one of those factors would allow the court to find that
the relationship between the parties was technically confidential. Arnold and Donald's
relationship meets not just one, but several of the factors, including kinship, disparity in
age, and inferior physical and mental condition of the grantor (Arnold). At the time of the
conveyance, Arnold was a sick man undergoing brutal treatments for his cancer. He had
only an eighth grade education and was deeply concerned about losing the trust property
as a result of his illness and the effect that loss would have on his wife and children.
Donald, on the other hand, was a healthy young married man. Donald was Arnold's
oldest son, and when Donald discussed with his ailing and distressed father a solution to
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Arnold's problem—which involved conveying mere fee title to the trust property to
Donald and Jeanette so that they could be responsible for taking care of the trust property
for the family and their father—it was natural for Arnold to trust Donald. That Arnold
depended upon Donald is evidenced by the fact that Donald, and not Arnold, was
communicating with the Welfare Department to determine how best to effect the transfer
of title. At this point, Arnold believed, and was justified in believing, that the transferee,
Donald, would act in Arnold's best interest. Arnold and Donald's relationship at the time
of the 1967 conveyance was plainly a confidential relationship.
The court need not find that Donald is guilty of undue influence or intentional
fraud in inducing Arnold to convey the property to him in order to impose a constructive
trust. Because Donald and Arnold were in a confidential relationship and Arnold
conveyed the property to Donald, the court need only look to see if Donald properly
performed his obligations as understood when looked at "sensibly and broadly and with
all human implications" when he accepted the property to hold for his ailing father and
later declared that the property was his with no obligation to the rest of his family.
Sinclair, 139 N. E. at 258. If he did not, then the district court's imposition of a
constructive trust was proper. Haws, 209 P.2d at 231.
Because Arnold had the necessary intent to split the legal and equitable title to his
property when he conveyed the land to Donald in 1967, and Arnold and Donald were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the conveyance, this Court should find that the
Court of Appeals' reversal of the constructive trust imposed by the district court was
improper.
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B. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the imposition of a constructive trust on the
trust property under the Restatement of Restitution §160 because Donald and
Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were to retain the trust property without
the imposition of a constructive trust
This court should uphold the District Court's imposition of a constructive trust on
the trust property because Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were to
retain the title to the trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust. The
Restatement of Restitution §160 declares, "Where a person holding title to property is
subject tot an equitable duty to convey it to another ion the ground that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises. Restatement
of Restitution §160.
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, and the
court has broad discretion in how it applies this remedy; the court is "bound by no
unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each
transaction wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in unjust
enrichment." Haws 209 P.2d at 232 (quoting 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1,
1946 Ed., §471); Restatement of Restitution §160; Parks v. Zions First NatfI Bank, 673
P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977);
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also
Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009); Kopp v. Tubies, 2008 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 82, 9-10 (Pa. County Ct. 2008); Murphy v. Middleton, 256 S.W.3d 159, 166167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex. 1974).
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County of Lake v. X-Po Sec. Police Service, Inc., 27 111. App. 3d 750, 755 (111. App. Ct.
2d Dist. 1975). Carnesecca v. Carnesecca provides a situation where the court imposed a
constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment. 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). A father
acquired certain property. Id. at 709. While his second son was in the army, the father's
first and third sons purchased the property from the father. Id. Later, the father required
the first and third sons to permit the second son to purchase a one-third interest in the
property, although title still remained in the names of the first and third sons. Id. When
the parties sold the property after the third son's death, the third son's widow attempted
to claim one-half of the money from the sale, claiming that she had title to half of the
property. Id. at 710. The court affirmed the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust
and concluded that the facts that the success of the farm had "obviously resulted from the
combined industry of the whole family," and that the second son had spent considerable
time and effort improving and working the land supported the imposition of a
constructive trust. Id., at 710-711.
Similarly, the Missouri court of appeals recently heard a case where a mother had
deeded property to her daughter approximately 16 years before and sought the imposition
of a constructive trust on that property. Murphy v. Middleton, 256 S.W.3d 159, 166-167
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008). The court held that the conveyance from the mother to daughter
was a gift, but gave a helpful statement regarding the purposes of a constructive trust:
Although not technically a trust, a "constructive trust" is merely the
machinery a court of equity uses as a remedy to right a past wrong. It has
been stated that the constructive trust is the device used by chancery to
force one who unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to
another to whom it justly belongs. It is a "method by which a court
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exercises its equitable powers to 'remedy a situation where a party has been
wrongfully deprived of some right, title, benefit or interest in property as a
result of fraud or in violation of confidence or faith reposed in another."5
Id. (citations omitted).
In a recent case in Pennsylvania, the court examining a constructive trust case
examined what circumstances give rise to a constructive trust:
A constructive trust is a formula through which the conscience of equity
finds expression. When property is acquired under circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interests, equity converts him to a trustee. Thus, a constructive trust arises
where a person holds title to a property subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he or she would be unjustly
enriched if permitted to retain it. Before a constructive trust can arise, it is
necessary that the owner of the property must have acquired title to it in
some way that creates an equitable duty in favor of the person seeking to
benefit from imposition of the trust.
Kopp v. Tubies, 2008 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 82, 9-10 (Pa. County Ct.
2008)(citations omitted).
A constructive trust, unlike other types of trusts, does not require a manifestation
of intent to create a trust and may be imposed by law regardless of the intention of the
parties. Restatement of Restitution §160, cmt. a; Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d
590, 598 (Utah 1983); Wells Fargo Bank American Trust Co. v. Greuner, 226 Cal. App.
2d 454, 460 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1964); Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009). In
Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the court imposed a constructive trust contrary to the
intent of the grantor. 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 1983) A man's wife died and left her estate
to the bank and to the hospital, with a monthly allowance for her husband. Id. at 594.
During the marriage, the wife had managed the couple's financial affairs, while most of
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the property was purchased with the husbands earnings. Id. at 591. The husband sought to
impose a constructive trust on certain furnishings and on the real property. Id. at 595.
This court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust and declared that the forms and
varieties of constructive trusts are virtually without limit. Id. at 597 This court also
clarified that constructive trusts are not dependant on the intention of the parties:
[Constructive trusts generally are not based upon the 'intention' of the
parties. Indeed, the most notable distinction between constructive trusts and
other types of trusts, such as express and resulting trusts, is generally the
'intention' element. It is axiomatic that an essential element of any
agreement is the 'intention' to create it. Accordingly, those constructive
trusts which may arise without proof of the parties' 'intention' to create a
trust cannot and do not require, as defendants propose, that some form of
agreement be manifested."
Id. at 598.
A constructive trust may be imposed even if the trust is directly in conflict with
legal title of the property. Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank 673 P.2d 590, 599 (Utah
1983). In Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the court broadly defined situations in
which the imposition of a constructive trust is appropriate:
Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust is raised by the
doctrines of equity for the purpose of working out justice in the most efficient
manner, where there is no intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in
most cases contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal title, and where
there is no express or implied, written or verbal, declaration of the trust.
Id. at 599(quoting J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1044
(1941)).
When determining whether a constructive trust is the proper equitable remedy, the
totality of circumstances and setting will be taken into account. Legault v. Legault, 459
A.2d 980, 984 (Vt. 1983); Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009); McGrath v.
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Eliding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 629, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331, 394 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1977). In
Legault v. Legault, a court imposed a constructive trust because the totality of
circumstances showed that unjust enrichment would occur if a constructive trust were not
imposed. Legault 459 A.2d at 984. A father sought to recover money from his foster
daughter through the imposition of a constructive trust. Id. at 982. The father had,
through the thirty-four years of his marriage, turned his paycheck over to his wife each
week for her to pay the bills and deposit the money in their joint account. Id. After the
wife's death, the father found that the alleged joint account his wife had told him she was
depositing the money in never existed. Id. Instead, the wife was depositing the money
into a joint account for her and the foster daughter. Id. The court imposed a constructive
trust on the money in the account in favor of the father, finding that it would be
inequitable for the foster daughter to retain the money. Id. at 984. The court counseled
that, when dealing with constructive trusts and equitable remedies, courts should examine
the totality of the circumstances regarding the situation, and not limit the inquiry to one
transaction:
Moreover, the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment rests upon the principle
"that a man shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
another." In other words, the inquiry is whether, in light of the totality of
circumstances, it is against equity and good conscience to allow defendant to
retain what is sought to be recovered. Thus, "whether there is unjust enrichment
may not be determined from a limited inquiry confined to an isolated transaction.
It must be a realistic determination based on a broad view of the human setting
involved."
Id. at 984.
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Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conveyance from
Arnold to Donald and the subsequent actions of the parties involved, the court should
conclude that Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to
become the owners of the trust property in their personal capacities and to keep the
proceeds from the trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust. Like the
family farm in the Carnesecca case, the success of the Rawlings trust property was a
direct result of the combined industry of the whole family. Testimony from Donald and
the other siblings is that everyone except Donald worked on the trust property in the
years following the 1967 conveyance while Arnold was alive and after his death. In
addition, the record shows that Donald received help from his family to put up fences
during the Vineyard Meadows dispute, which aided Donald in reaching a settlement
agreement. Donald and Jeanette, who co-mingled the proceeds from the operation of the
trust property—including proceeds from the settlement agreement—with their own
money, would be unjustly enriched without the imposition of a constructive trust.
Arnold and Cleo paid the back taxes on the land even after the 1967 conveyance,
and Arnold continued to use and treat the land as his own, taking responsibility for the
care and maintenance of the trust property without Donald's help, and without
compensation from Donald. Indeed, the proceeds from the trust property were used for
the support of Arnold's widow, Cleo, and Donald represented to the other members of the
family when he asked for the quit claim deeds in 1974 that he needed their help to save
their mother's farm.
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In spite of the testimonies given by the other members of the family and Arnold's
actions to the contrary, Donald and Jeanette maintain that they were deeded the land in
fee simple in 1967 as compensation for paying off the mortgage on the land with the bank
and saving the land from being lost. However, the only evidence that Donald and Jeanette
have of their "mortgage payment" is the handwritten notation on the only checks
produced, which was written by Jeanette after this litigation began. Their bank records
show that no payments other than those made by those checks were made by them to
Walker Bank during that time. Evidence has been introduced that Donald and his wife
had additional loans with the bank at that time, and it is reasonable to infer that the
payments they allege they were making on Arnold's mortgage were actually payments on
their own loans at the bank. Taken with the testimony of the all of the other brothers,
who stated that they were led to understand that the conveyance would be temporary if
Arnold recovered and that the land would go to the family if he did not, the court can
reasonably infer that Arnold's purpose in conveying the land to Donald was the express
purpose that he stated many times: to get the land out of his name as the Welfare
Department advised him to do. Since Arnold did not intend for the land to be
compensation to Donald for a payment of a mortgage loan, Donald would be unjustly
enriched if he were to keep the land without the imposition of a constructive trust.
Even if this Court accepts the Court of Appeals' reading of the finding of fact
regarding Arnold's intent to transfer the land and determine that he did not intend to
transfer the land at all, the Court may still properly impose a constructive trust under
Restatement §160. The Court of Appeals stated that without Arnold's intent to create a
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trust, no constructive trust could be imposed. However, as the court expressed in the
Parks case, a constructive trust, unlike other trusts, does not depend on the intent of the
parties and may be imposed contrary to the intention of the party holding the legal title.
The court is "bound by no unyielding formula" when it imposes a constructive trust to
prevent unjust enrichment, and the forms and varieties of constructive trusts are virtually
unlimited. If the court accepts the Court of Appeals' reasoning that "Arnold did not
intend to transfer the farm at all," then Donald is still unjustly enriched. If Arnold did not
intend to transfer the trust property to Donald, and after numerous years of watching his
family perform work on the trust property knowing that they believed that the work they
were doing was for a farm in which they all had an interest (and expressing to them that
the trust property and its proceeds were to help their widowed mother) but performing no
work himself, Donald claims the property and all the proceeds for himself, he is unjustly
enriched, and the court may impose a constructive trust regardless of the intent of the
parties.
Because, regardless of Arnold's intent to create a trust at the time of the 1967
conveyance, Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to
retain title to the trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust, this Court
should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and impose a constructive trust on the trust
property.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court hold that the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive trust.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /j_ day of May 2009.

ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

THOMAS W. SEILER
Attorney for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was provided to
the following by placing CES^y thereof in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, this

j^ht

day of May 2009, addressed as follows:
M. David Eckersley #0956
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
M. Dayle Jeffs
Jeffs & Jeffs
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 801-373-8848
Attorneys for Petitioners
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Addendum
Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dated August 24, 2007).
Memorandum Decision
Final Order
Court of Appeals Opinion: Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478 (Utah Ct. App.
2008) (Dated December, 26, 2008).
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Fourth Judicial District Court
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JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Third-Party Plainli Ffs
Theron LaRcll Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings,
and Carol Lynn R. Mastcrson
90 North 100 East
P O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801)373-8878
THOMAS W. SE1LER, #2910
ROBINSON, SEILER, & ANDERSON, LC
Attorneys for Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings
2500 North. University Avenue
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
IN THE FOURTH .TUDTCIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANBTTE
RAWLINGS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No 970400260
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
Defendants.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLMGS, as Trustees of the
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust,
THERON LaRBLL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

Division No. 9

vs.
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.
THERON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs
vs.
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is
unknown,
Third Party Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constructive trust. Following the presentation of
evidence and by agreement, each ofthe parties submitted aPost-TrialMemorandummarshalinglheir
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties1
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and having heretofore entered its ruling
2

on the bifurcated issue, the Court now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on the issue of constructive trust:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Arnold J. Rawlings (hereinafter ''Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings (hereinafter "Cleo")

had five children who are, in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (hereinafter "Donald"), Arnold
Dwayne Rawlings (hereinafter ccDwayne"). Theron LaRell Rawlings (hereinafter "LaReir), Bryce
C. Rawlings (hereinafter "Bryce"), and Carol Lynn Rawlings Mastcrson (hereinafter "Carol").
2.

Arnold Rawlings acquired the propertyfromhis mother in 1944. From that time until

the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was not on the title to the property at issue in this case.
Cleo has no ownership interest in the farm property.
3.

Arnold solely owned approximately 22.37 acres of property in Orem, Arnold sold

12 acres, leaving approximately 10.37 acres.
4

Tn 1962 Arnold deeded property roughly adjacent to Arnold's home to Dwayne

Rawlings and spouse on which they built a home. Tn 1967 a very small piece was deeded to Dwayne
and spouse by Arnold between the property where Arnold's home was and where Dwayne and
spouse built there home, hi 1960 Arnold deeded to Donald and spouse a property slightly to the west
of the property deeded to Dwayne. Donald built his home on that property. Adjacent to the home
on which Donald built his home, Arnold deeded in 1964 property to Donald which has been referred
Lo as the barn property, in 1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of
Dwayne's home ("the garden") and the other south of the barn property ("the orchard").
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5.

In 1963 the farm was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed.

(Exhibit S)
6.

hi 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a Conditional Sales Contract with the

pledge of a Ford trust and an Oidsmobile automobile.
7-

The transaction consisted of a rewri ting of the loan with the replacement of security.

8.

By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately

required medical attention.
9.

Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the Welfare Department

about his intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was corroborated
by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department refemng to a prior meeting, and provides proff
of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt.
10.

On December 22,2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor,

following which he labored to recover from his illness.
11.

in January of 1967, Arnold began a series of 20 cobalt treatments. The medical

attention that Arnold required was extremely expensive. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the
medical treatment and received welfare assistance.
12.

Donald Rawlings discussed his intention to transfer Arnold's property into Donald's

name (see Exhibit 8, a letter dated December 16,1966, from the Utah County Department of Public
Welfare to Donald Rawlings).
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13.

The letter from the Welfare Department was addressed to Donald, not to Arnold or

Cleo, the persons receiving the benefits from the Welfare Department pertaining to his illness.
14.

The Utah County Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter "Welfare Department11)

would pay the majority of the medical expenses associated with Arnold's illness if Arnold's property
was not in his name (other than Arnold's home).
15.

Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital for additional medical treatment on

February 16„ 1967, Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital again for yet more medical
treatment on March 14, 1967.
16.

The undisputed testimony is that Arnold's health steadily deteriorated, and he was

in very poor health on March 24,1967. He was somewhat advanced in age. He had an eighth grade
or less education and was very concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare
Department.
17.

Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded with the Utah County Recorder on

March 24,1967, Arnold deeded the property referred to as the farm property or the trust property to
Donald and spouse. Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal description. Althougli
Cleo' s signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership interest in the trust property, and there was
no testimony given as to why she executed any deed that was offered into evidence in this matter.
18.

On March 24,1967, Arnold conveyed by Warranty Deed three parcels to D wayne and

spouse. This deed, with plats as to each of the three parcels, was admitted as Exhibits 14, 15, and
16. The undisputed testimony was that parcel 1 was a small portion between Arnold's homes and
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Dwayne's home which Arnold had sometime earlier sold to Dwayne and spouse. Further, the
undisputed testimony was that parcel 2 on Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 has been continuously held by
Dwayne as part of the constructive trust property for and on behalf of the family members to be
distributed as the Court orders.
19.

On March 24 7 1967, a Quit-Claim Deed (hereinafter ctthe sibling deed") was signed

by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol, andBryce and spouse to Donald and spouse. This
sibling deed contained a legal description for the trust property. Overtime, small neighboring pieces
of property were added to the trust property m various deeds signed by Donald's siblings and most
sibling spouses.
20.

The undisputed testimony is that the operation of the trust property or the family farm

continued exactly the same before and after March 24, 1967, except that, because of Arnold's
weakened physical condition, sometimes he could do very little work. Donald also testified on cross
examination, when confronted with his deposition testimony, that although Arnold would go down
to the property and Dwayne, Bryce, and LaRell helped on the property "all 1 (Donald) know is that
J didn't"
21.

On cross examination Donald also admitted, when confronted with his deposition

testimony, that Arnold continued to have property until 1970.
22.

After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that income

from the trust property was being used to support their mother.
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23.

Both before and after March 24, 1967, and both before and after Arnold's death,

Donald's siblings, sometimes their spouses and sometimes their children, worked in the orchard on
the trust property, the work done after Arnold's death was with the understanding that the income
was to be used to support Geo,
24.

In 1974, the Vineyard Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south

boundary line of the trust property (see Exhibit 1). As it was developed, fences were placed in the
backyards of the homes in Vineyard Meadows Subdivision, generally along the south boundary line
of the trust property. Donald told Dwayne that the fences in those backyards encroached upon
"Mother's farm.-" At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm/' Dwayne
and his son worked with Donald and his son lo place a fence through the backyards of the home
owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for "Mother's farm" was. Dwayne
regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Samt ward with the people who lived in
those homes. He and his spouse were friends with those home owners. Nevertheless, the undisputed
testimony is, in order to assist in the protection of the family farm or trust property, Dwayne and his
son placed fencing in those yards. Ultimately, the litigation surrounding the boundary dispute was
resolved. Donald caused some of the flmds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings
(LaRell refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support. This included the
purchase of a car,
25.

As part of du's boundary dispute with Vineyard Meadows Subdivision home owners,

Donald convinced his siblings to sign another deed in 1974, which he explained to diem contained
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a legal description only of the disputed area. The deed named Donald and spouse as grantees. In
fact, it contained a mach larger legal description that included all of the trust property. If, in fact,
Donald and spouse had owned the property before, no such deed would have been necessary.
26

In April of 1978, Donald and spouse deeded a Vx interest in a portion of the trust

property to Dwayne and spouse. This property appears as Exhibit 1 as the Pincgar property. The
Pinegar property was then deeded as part of a 1031 exchange to Mr. and Mrs. Jack Hadley and Mrand Mrs. Merrill Gappmayer. Out of that exchange, Donald and spouse and Dwayne and spouse
were deeded property located on Mountain Way Drive and 400 South in Orem^ which was referred
to throughout the Trial as the industrial property The Pinegar property was credited as a 1/3 down
payment, or $15,000 00 of the $45,000.00 purchase price of the industrial property. The balance of
the purchase price was paid for, $15,000.00 by Donald md spouse and $15,000.00 by Dwayne and
spouse through loans obtained by the respective parties.
27.

Donald and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29,

2966, upon which the bank surrendered its conditional sales contract. (Exhibit 9)
28.

The conditional sales contract was stamped "paid."

29.

The conditional contract shows that it was a stamped "paid" on December 15,1966

altered by ink to show a date of December 29,1966.
30.

By the terras of the conditional sales constract, the bank's remedy was a recourse to

the automobile company under a full recourse clause.
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31.

In addition, the bank had a security interest in the Ford truck and Oldsmobiie which

could have been foreclosed and taken m satisfaction of the remaining debt. Tf a foreclosure of the
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait 90 days
to for the debtors to cure the default before the Notice of Sale could have been published. No such
recording was ever produced and is not a record in the Utah County Recorder's Office
32.

No evidence was presented that the check for $579,06 was the required loan payoff

amount.
33.

Joanettc (Donald's spouse) testified that she and Donald had indebtedness with

Walker Bank and Trust Company for the building of their home at the same time period.
34.

In 1966 and 1967, Donald and spouse had loans with the Walker Bank. Commencing

June 29, 1966, Donald and spouse made the following payments, by check, to Walker Bank:

[~~

DATE

AMOUNT

|
$150.00 |

j June 29,1966
July 19, 2966

100 00 |

August 10, 1966

100.00 |

wSeplember 21, 1966

100.00 |

j October 19, 1966

100 00

November 21, 1966

100.00

December 29, 1966

579.061

[TOTAL

$1,229.06
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35.

Donald and Jeanctte's banking records offered into evidence during the trial revealed

no other payments to Walker Bank daring the time frame, in spite of uncontroverted testimony of
Jeanette Rawlings, that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been
made with Walker Bank and trust during that time frame.
36.

Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance on the trust deed (Exhibit

9) at die same time. That testimony, however, is unpersuasive.
37.

The deeding ofthe trust propertyto Donald and Jeanette occurred onMarch24,1967,

some three months after the alleged payment ofthe Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs.
38.

After the litigation commenced, Donald's spouse, Jeannette Rawlings, altered the

checks evidencing the above payments, by adding language on each of them to indicate they were
paid to Wallcer Bank and Trust Company for and on behalf of Arnold Rawlings. It was only during
the May 9, 2005 deposition of Jeannette Rawlings (Donald's spouse) that she admitted to the
alteration ofthe documentary evidence, by notations made after this suit was filed, for the purpose
of designating those checks as checks paid on Arnold Rawlings5 account,
39.

Noting those circumstances, the Court is nnpersnaded that the Plaintiffs9 assertions

regarding the December 29, 1966, check and concludes the Plaintiffs' statements are not supported
by the records and the evidence.
40.

The Court is unpersuaded that the farm was deeded by the parties' father to Donald

and Jeanette because of die payment ofthe alleged indebtedness.
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41.

During trial, neither Donald nor Jeanette testified the reason for the deed was because

they had paid off the loan.
42.

No testimony was presented of any agreement between Donald and his father that the

farm was deeded because of payment of the indebtedness,
43.

LaRcll Rawlings testified that in late February or early March that his father had a

conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he needed to get the property out of Arnold's
name because of the Welfare Department's requirement that it be transferred out of his name.
44.

LaRell suggested it be placed in Dwayne's name as he would be most fair with the

45.

At a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a restaurant with both Donald and Arnold

family.

present, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald because of the Welfare
requirement for receiving assistance.
46.

That conversation (see Paragraph 45) was in the presence of Donald7 was undisputed

by Donald at trial, and remains uncontradicted and unrebutted.
47.

No mention was made in that conversation of any payment of the Walker Bank debt

or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Bank debt.
48.

One or two days before Mary 24,1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald

and Arnold met with Dwayne Rawlings and infonned him that they were deeding the trust property
to Donald because Arnold needed to get the trust property out of his name, consistent with other
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concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer had anything to
do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt.
49.

No where in this proceeding have Donald or Jeanette testified disputing that the

testimony of Dwayne to the meeting two days before the conveyance of the trust property.
50.

In January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on the

trust property, Dwayne borrowed $1,000.00 ixom the credit union at Geneva Steel and endorsed that
check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxes which Donald alleged weie due
on the trust property. Donald did not deliver this $1,000,00 to the Utah County Assessor for
paynient of real estate taxes until after the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold.
51.

If the March 24, 1967, deed had been intended to transfer ownership to Donaid for

the payment of the Walker Bank debt in December of 1966, Arnold would not have been concerned
about paying the back taxes, as it would be Donald's responsibility.
52.

On March 24, 1967, Donald and spouse caused $1,267.00 ($1,000.00 of which was

paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office on the trust property and on other
properties owned by Donald and spouse.
53.

It is unrebutted that Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the March

24,1967, conveyance to Donald and spouse was because Arnold had to get the property out of his
name as required by the Welfare Department.
54.

Plaintiffs did not produce any persuasive testimony contradicting the testimony of

Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject
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55.

There has heen inadequate explanation by Donald and spouse as to why the siblings

and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked 10 sign the March 2471967
Quit-Claim Deed, Exhibit 12.
56.

After March 24, 1967, deed, Arnold continued to treat the farm as his own.

57.

Bryce Rawlings testified that his father signed the March 24, 1967, deed to Donald

and spouse intending only to make it a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter
their expected shares of the farm.
58.

hi February of 1970, LaRell was in the military. Arnold asked that the military

release or discharge LaRell early to help on Arnold's farm, the trust property. Tn that regard, the
Court admitted the following into evidence:
a.

Exhibit 22, a letter from Kent Stewart of the Utah State Department of

Highways, which stated m part:
"With LaRelPs brothers either unable or unwilling to help their father with his farm,
the future would be veiy precarious for him financially... In my opinion the only
way Arnold Rawlings could operate his farm is with the fixll time help of Ms son,
LaRell..."
b.

Exhibit 23, a letter dated February 18, 1970, addressed to the commanding

officer of Dugway Proving Grounds and signed by Darryl M. Williams, MD. The letter first explains
that Arnold has had a diagnosis of lymphosarcoma and states: ifiMr. Rawlings complains of
generalized symptoms that apparently prevent him from carrying on his normal work as a farmer."
Doctor Williams goes on the state that Arnold "does at the present time have evidence of
active disease; the prognosis in this instance must be considered guarded."
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c.

Exhibit 24, a letter from Dr. Watson L. Lafferty dated February 16n 1970,

states, in part:
"Mr. Rawlings has been under my care for one year, with a cronic [sic] health
condition and is unable to do his farming. Due to his inability to do the hard labor
which is necessary to operate his farm the need for his son is very urgent."
d.

Exhibit 25 is a letter dated February 16,1970 and signed, by the Honorable

Merrill L. Hermansen, Third Distiict Juvenile Court, State of Utah. Judge Hermansen explains that
he became acquainted with Arnold's medical condition because Arnold and Judge Hermansen were
confined in Utah Valley Hospital at the same time. Judge Hermansen goes on to stale;
"I am aware that he is disabled with cancer and that he has as his only means of
support the operation of a small farm also located in the Orem area. His illness
makes it impossible for him to operate this farm, and it is almost his only income,
I would therefore recommend that a hardship discharge be granted to Tlierin [sic]
LaRell Rawlings in order that he may take care of this urgent family problem, to wit:
that of the support of his mother and father.'*
e.

A letter dated February 10,1970 addressed to the U.S. Army and written to

Leo G. Meredith, manager of Chipman's Mercantile Company in American Fork, Utah- Mr.
Meredith states:
"[LaRell] and [Arnold]...have operated together in a project of raising fruit, together
with pleasure horses for sale. The Father is working under a handicap of a health
problem to a point where he is unable to do any of the work connected with breaking
and training the horses for sale, nor is he able to do any of the heavy work related to
the production of the fruit and the sale of thereof."
f.

Exhibit 27 is a sworn statement of Glen Merrill dared February 20, 1970.

Therein he states:
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"[Arnold] is unable to take care of Ms orchard and small farm. [Arnold] has no one
who is free to help him Ha has a single son, LaRell, who lived with his mother and
father and attend to these necessary duties but is now in the Army stationed at
Dugway, Utah,
"I believe it would be better for all concerned if LaRell could be released to again
look after the welfare of his aging and sick parents. This is a hardship case."
g.

Exhibit2S is alerter from the Honorable Noal IT, Wootton. Mr, Wootton was

an attorney who practice for many years in Utah County but who passed away m 2006, Mr, Wootton
makes the following affirmative representations to the commanding officer of Dugway Proving
Grounds:
(1) He represents Arnold.
(2) Arnold is disabled with cancer.
(3) Arnold's sole source of support is a 10-acre farm which he operates.
(4) Without the aid of LaRell, Arnold and Cleo are going to suffer extreme
hardships.
h.

Exhibit 29 is a letter dated January 14, 1970, from Ray E, Gammon. Mr.

Gammon was a long-time attorney in Utah County who is now retired. Mr. Gammon makes the
following affirmative representations:
(1) He has known LaRell and his family for the past several years.
(2) LaRell has taken care of the family orchard.
(3) Arnold has been and is receiving treatment for cancer.
(4) Arnold is unable to care for the farm.
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58.

Tn addition to doctors, lawyers, a judge, and businessmen, Arnold, himself, executed

not one but two affidavits.
a.

Exhibit 19 is an affidavit executed byArnold dated February 13,1970. Inthe

February 13,1970 affidavit, Arnold swears:
"that he his engaged as a farmer, Livestock Raiser, and for many years has been
dependent upon his son, Theron LaRell Rawlings, to assist him in the operation of
his farm."
'That the undersigned is 64 years of age and is severely afflicted with cancer and is
able to do but little of the work required for the operation of his faroi, and he is badly
in need of the services of said son to assist him in the planting, cultivating, irrigating,
and harvesting of his crops and in caring for his livestock."
b.

Exhibit 20 is Arnold's second affidavit. In that affidavit Arnold swears that;
(1) He has health problems which makes it impossible to do the hard labor

required by the farm.
(2) Last fall he lost several hundred bushels of pears because he could not get
them picked and to market in time.
(3) That he has three other boys living in the area, but that he had not been
getting any help from them.
(4) That LaRell had stayed at home and helped since his illness a few years
ago, and that LaRell was the only one he could turn to at that time.
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59.

The letters referred to in paragraph 57 and the affidavits of Arnold Rawlmgs

(paragraph 58) make it clear that the farm was still Arnold's. The only purpose for deeding the farm
into Donald's name could have been for protection against the Welfare Department.
60

Exhibits 52 and 57 are Arnold* s medical records for December 1966 through March

1871969. The medical records note that on February 16, 1967, shortly before the execution of the
deeds which create the constractive trust in this matter, that Arnold was admitted to the hospital
because of his inability to care for himself at home. Arnold had presented an immediate distress
from an abscessed area of his right groin.
6L

The medical records make it clear that after the December 22, 1966 surgery, Arnold

underwent approximately 20 treatments of high energy radiotherapy (cobalt 60) and that the dosage
administered was approximately 400 RAD (TD). They go on to say:
"Subsequently, the patient did well until 1967. At that time, during a routine
follow up examination, the patient was noted to have bi-latcral axillary
lymphadenopathy as well as evidence of "chest involvement" Because of this, he
was again treated with cobalt therapy at St. Marks Hospital in December 1967."
62.

Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer ofhis ownership rights in the

property.
63.

Arnold also requested and procured help from a number of people supporting his

request to have LaRcll discharged from the military to help him work "his" farm, as referenced by
Exhibits 22, and 24-29,
64.

After the March 24,1967, deed, Donald did not help in fanning the trust property of

his father.
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65.

On March 1,1971, Arnold Rawlings died.

66.

During all of Arnold's lifetime, all of the income from the trust property went to

Arnold. After Arnold's death,, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that the income from
the trust property was being used to support their mother.
67.

On March 30,1971, Cleo Rawlings, his widow, paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which

included all of the trust property.
68.

Such evidence also supports the factual conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the

farm (the trust property) was the family farm*
69.

Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission from Arnold to put a

trailer on the trust property for a residence. Arnold showed Bryce where on the trust property to
place the trailer, and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm (the trust property) for four or five years
following his father's death. This evidence supports the conclusion that the parties considered the
farm a family farm.
70.

Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence line

across the encroaching developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with the title
companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000.00. (See paragraph 24
above.)
71.

From these proceeds, Donald gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to

Dwayne, with approximately $5,000 for a care and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. He offered
$500 to LaRell which LaRell refused.
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72.

Donald testified that the 1974 Quit-Claim Deed was not to convey any interest in the

property from his siblings but was only to clear up the title problem on the south boundary. The
Court is unpersuaded by Donald*s testimony.
73.

In 1978 Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pinegar

Lot to Dwayne and Paulcttc.
74.

In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell property, shown as Exhibit

1, for 6.5 acres in Washington County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the
Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, told any sibling they believed they owned
the trust properly, and they were using the funds or income from the trust property in any way they
chose.
75.

The work of all the family members on the farm, except Donald, on the irrigating,

harvesting, and marketing of the fruit, the management of the horses and the proceeds of tbe fruit
being given to the mother, Cleo, the waiting of so long to' take action by the siblings is readily
apparent by the trust that they had in their older brother (Donald) that he would do what was right,
but by his own actions during the period following the conveyance all demonstrate the faim as a
family farm.
76.

I
The testimony is undisputed that Donald co-mingled the funds from the trustproperty

with his other funds and is unable to distinguish any funds which he spent at any time from March
24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their source whether they came froqa the trust property income or
from income from some other source.
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11.

The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion

that the siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in their older brother that he would
do what was right for the family, and as buttressed by then- own actions during the period following
the conveyance.
78. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of a final judgment
consistent with the findings and conclusions herein.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact by the Court, the Court now makes and enters the
following conclusions of law:
1.

The March 24, 1967, deed from Arnold and Cleo Rawlings to Donald and Jeanette

Rawlings was not for the payment of debt to Walker Banlc and Trust Company or for the payment
of taxes.
2.

The deed transfer was for accommodation and not intended to transfer ownership to

Donald and Jeanette Rawlings,
3.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the foregoing findings of fact

establish a equitable need to impose a constructive trust on the property conveyed hi the 1967 deeds
and the 1974 deeds.
4.

The actions regarding the property by Donald and Jeanette are for the benefit of the

trust property.
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5.

From the inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received

unjust enrichment of the property which they treated as their own which included $15000.00 of the
rouglily $ 1,200.00 taxes that were paid by Dwayne and his spouse, the barn property, the proceeds
from the operation of the trust property, and approximately $523000.00 from negotiated payments
regarding the south boundary fence dispute as well as other benefits from the use and negotiations
relative to the trust property.
6.

The Court concludes that it should enter a final judgment on the issue that was tried

as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment on the constructive trust issue pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED and SIGNED this ^ >

day of August, 2007..
BY THE COURT

M. David Eckersly
ROBINSON, SEILERS, & ANDERSON

Thomas W. Seller
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IN THE FOURTH J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS,

JUDGMENT ON ISSUE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND RULE
54(B) DETERMINATION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
Defendants.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust,
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLTNGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 970400260
Qivision No. 9

vs.

DONALD RAWL1NGS and XEANETTE
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.

THBRON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs
vs.

DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS, |
as Trustees of a Trust whoso name is
unknown,
|
Third Party Defendants.

J

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constmctive trust. Following the presentation of
evidence and by agreement, each o f the parties submitted a Post-Tri al Mem orandum marshaling their
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties'
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and having heretofore entered its-ruling
2

on the bifurcated issue, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now
makes and enters the following:

'

JUDGMENT ON CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ISSUE
1.

The conveyances by the 1967 and 1974 deeds created a constructive trust on the

property described therein.
2.

The Court concludes that there is no just reason for delay entry of judgment herein

on the issue that was tried as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment on the
constructive trust issue pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED and SIGNED this " ^ g ? d a y of August, 2007.

;

BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
.*^r«w.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. David Eckersly
ROBINSON, SEHJBRS, & ANDERSON

id

Thomas W. Seiler

_ ^\,

>

JEFFS & JEFFS. P.C.

M. Dayle Jeffs
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
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vs.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS, FOR PAYMENT OF
MEDIATOR'S FEES, AND FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF OPPOSING
COUNSEL

ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
Defendants.
\RNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
'AULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the
knold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust,
ffiERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
IAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R,
vlASTERSON,
Third-Party Plaintiffe,
vs.

)ONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
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Third-Party Defendants.
HERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
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MSTERSON,

Civil No. 970400260
Judge Howard

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Order to Show Cause issued by the Court on
October 12, 2006, requiring Plaintiffs to appear before this Court on the 13th day of November at
9:00 AM. and show cause, if any they have, why fees and sanctions should not be imposed for
alleged failure to comply with Rules 101(c) and/or 101(h) of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Said order had been issued pursuant to the motion of Theron
LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn Masterson as third party plaintiffs and
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings as defendants and third party plaintiffs Joint
Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees, and for Attorney's Fees of Opposing
Counsel. The Court having read the respective submissions of the parties and having carefully
read and reread the language of the rules, the Court having reviewed the Court Rules for CourtAnnexed Alternative Dispute Resolution several times, and having heard the oral arguments of

counsel for and against said motion, and being fully advised on the premises, now makes and
enters the following:
Rule 101(c) of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution provides
in pertinent part that "All parties shall be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the
authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case...The mediation conference should proceed
in a fashion that furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves confidentiality, and
encourages candor on the part of participating parties."
That provision requires good faith discussion, and while parties may temrinate that
process, they may only do so after they have engaged in the settlement process in good faith.
Afer a careful review of the record and being fully advised in the premises by counsel for all
parties, Ifindthat the Plaintiffs came to the mediation with a fully formed intention not to
participate in the mediation in good faith and had determined that they would not be prepared to
discuss all relevant issues in this case. Ifindthese actions and formed intentions to violate Rule
101(c), above. Therefore, based upon Rule 101(c), above, and the inherent powers of the Court,
the Court grants the Joint Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees and for
Attorney's Fees of Opposing Counsel pursuant to the affidavits filed with the joint motion. The
Court orders the Plaintiffs pay the sum of $2,937.00 to the moving parties within 30 days.
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Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (collectively, the Grantees)
appeal from the district court's entry of judgment finding an
equitable constructive trust in favor of Dwayne and Paulette
Rawlings, LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R.
Masterson (collectively, the Siblings). 1 We reverse the judgment
of the district court, as well as an order imposing sanctions
against the Grantees for failing to participate in mediation
proceedings in good faith.
%2
This dispute centers on a family farm that Arnold Rawlings
transferred to the Grantees by deed in 1967. The Grantees are
Arnold and Cleo Rawlings's oldest son, Donald, and Donald 1 s wife,
Jeanette. The Siblings comprise the rest of Arnold and Cleo's
children, along with Dwayne's wife, Paulette. As summarized in
greater detail below, the Grantees' position in this litigation
is that they own the farm in fee simple pursuant to the 1967 deed
from Arnold. The Siblings argue that the Grantees hold the farm
in trust for the entire surviving family under a constructive
trust theory. After a four-day trial exploring the circumstances
of the 1967 deed, the district court agreed with the Siblings and
imposed an equitable constructive trust on the Grantees in regard
to the farm.
BACKGROUND
f3
Arnold acquired the farm from his mother in 1944. In 1966,
Arnold was diagnosed with cancer. Arnold believed that he would
be unable to obtain state-provided cancer treatment if he
retained the farm in his name. This belief motivated Arnold to
explore the possibility of transferring the farm to one of his
sons as a means of getting it out of his name while still keeping
it in the family. On March 24, 1967, Arnold conveyed the farm to
the Grantees by warranty deed. Arnold's wife, Cleo, also signed
the warranty deed although her name was not on the title to the
farm. That same day, each of the Siblings signed quit-claim
deeds transferring any interest they may have had in the farm to
the Grantees. The Siblings contend that the transfer to the
Grantees was always meant to be for their collective benefit as a
family farm.
1. Dwayne Rawlings's full name is Arnold Dwayne Rawlings, and
LaRell Rawlings's full name is Theron LaRell Rawlings. We refer
to them as Dwayne and LaRell to be consistent with references in
the record and to differentiate between Dwayne Rawlings and his
father, Arnold Rawlings. We also note that when we employ the
term the Siblings as a descriptor of the beneficiaries of the
purported trust in this case, the term includes all purported
beneficiaries, including Grantees and Arnold and Cleo Rawlings.
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1(4
After the transfer, Arnold and Cleo continued to live and
work on the farm as if no transfer had occurred. When Arnold
died in 1971, Cleo continued to live on the farm and family
members worked the farm for her benefit. In 1974, the Grantees
litigated a boundary dispute with the farm's southern neighbor.
The Grantees' success in litigating the matter led to a
settlement with several title companies, who paid the Grantees
$52,000. The Grantees kept the bulk of that money but did
distribute portions to Cleo and the Siblings.
I
f5
In 1978, the Grantees deeded one of the lots comprising the
farm to themselves and Dwayne and Paulette in joint tenancy.
About this same time, Donald and Dwayne began a business selling
topsoil. In 1993, the Grantees asserted, allegedly for the first
time, that they owned the farm free and clear and were not
holding it in trust for the Siblings. This dispute over the
nature of the Grantees' ownership interest in the farm led to the
dissolution of Donald and Dwayne!s business, and the Grantees
eventually sued Dwayne and Paulette. Dwayne and Paulette filed a
counterclaim and self-described third-party complaint against the
Grantees in their individual capacities and as trustees of an
alleged trust, asserting a constructive trust over the farm
property. The remainder of the Siblings joined in the
counterclaim and third-party complaint. After extensive
discovery, the district court bifurcated the parties' disputes
and decided to first address the constructive trust issue.
f6
Prior to trial, the district court ordered the parties to
mediate their disputes. The Grantees informed the Siblings
before mediation that they had no intent of considering any
settlement of the matter. The Grantees appeared at the mediation
session and told the mediator the same thing. The mediation
session did not result in a settlement. Afterwards, the Siblings
sought sanctions from the Grantees, alleging that they did not
participate in mediation in good faith. The district court
agreed, and ordered the Grantees to pay the Siblings $293 7 in
expenses that the Siblings had incurred during the mediation
process.
H7
A four-day trial on the constructive trust issue commenced
on March 12, 2 007. The bulk of the trial was comprised of the
Siblings' testimony describing the circumstances of the 1967
transfer and the family's treatment of the farm property after
that date. Several of the Siblings testified to conversations
that they had had with Arnold prior to the transfer,
conversations that the Siblings interpreted as expressing an
intent to place the farm in trust. The Grantees used the
Siblings' testimony to explore issues regarding the Grantees'
payment of debts owed by Arnold, which the Grantees argued
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supported their position that Arnold intended to transfer the
farm to them in fee simple.
1f8
At the close of the Siblings' evidence, the Grantees moved
for dismissal of the Siblings' constructive trust claims. The
Grantees' motion and the Siblings' opposition to that motion
relied on very different legal theories as to how the district
court should evaluate the evidence at trial. The Grantees argued
that the only way a constructive trust could have arisen in this
case is if Arnold had attempted to create an express trust at the
time of the transfer, but that express trust failed due to the
lack of a writing evidencing the trust. Under the Grantees'
theory, no trust was created unless Arnold intended to transfer
the farm property into trust and Arnold and the Grantees were in
a confidential relationship at the time of the transfer. The
Siblings theory was much broader, asserting that the district
court could simply employ its equitable powers to impose a
constructive trust if it felt the circumstances warranted it.
The district court requested written briefing from the parties on
their respective positions and took the matter under advisement.
The Grantees then presented their case, comprised solely of their
own brief testimony, and the trial concluded.
If9
Two months after trial, the district court ruled on the
constructive trust issue. The district court expressly adopted
the Siblings' argument that it could impose a trust relying
solely on equitable principles and without regard to Arnold's
intent or relationship to the Grantees at the time of transfer.
The ruling recited an extensive factual summary of the testimony
at trial, rejected the Grantees' alternative argument that the
transfer was in consideration of them paying off a prior
mortgage, and determined that Arnold had intended the conveyance
solely as a mechanism to protect the family's ownership of the
farm and did not intend the deed to operate as an actual transfer
at all. The ruling concluded with the statement that the
district court was "exercis[ing] its equitable powers to impose a
constructive trust." In findings of fact prepared from the
district court's ruling and later signed by the court, the court
found as a factual matter that "Arnold did not consider the
[1967] conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the
[farm]."
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f10 On appeal from the district court's final order imposing an
equitable constructive trust, the Grantees argue that the
Siblings failed to present sufficient evidence in the district
court to support the imposition of a trust under the
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circumstances of this case.2 "'When an appellant is essentially
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a clearly
erroneous standard of appellate review applies. 1 " Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 2008 UT App 105, ^ 10,
182 P.3d 417 (quoting Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 487,
489 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). However, we review a district court's
decisions on questions of law, such as the legal requirements for
the imposition of constructive trusts, for correctness. See,
e.g., Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, f 8, 71 P.3d 589 ("The validity
of [a] trust is an issue of law, which we review for
correctness.").
1fll The Grantees also argue that the district court erred when
it imposed sanctions against the Grantees based on their alleged
lack of good faith participation in court-ordered mediation. The
proper interpretation of court rules presents an issue of law
that we review for correctness. See, e.g., N.A.R., Inc. v. Farr,
2000 UT App 62, f 5, 997 P.2d 343 ("'A trial court's
interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness.'" (quoting Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175,
H 5, 982 P.2d 586)).
ANALYSIS
I.

The District Court's Finding of an Equitable
Constructive Trust

fl2 The Grantees first challenge the evidentiary basis for the
district court's imposition of an equitable constructive trust.
Specifically, the Grantees argue that there is no evidence to
support two elements that they assert must exist in order to
impose a constructive trust in this case: (1) that a
confidential relationship existed between Arnold and the Grantees
at the time Arnold transferred the farm to the Grantees and
(2) that Arnold intended to transfer ownership of the farm to the
Grantees in trust for the Siblings. The Siblings counter that
neither a confidential relationship nor any particular intent on
the part of Arnold is a prerequisite to a court's imposition of a
constructive trust on purely equitable principles. Thus, we
first determine the proper legal analysis for the constructive
trust issue and then turn to the question of whether the Grantees
have identified an evidentiary barrier to the imposition of a
trust in favor of the Siblings.
2. The Grantees also raise a statute of limitations argument
that we decline to address in light of our resolution of the case
in the Grantees' favor on other grounds.
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A.

Trust Requirements

Ul3 The Grantees and the Siblings present us, and presented the
district court, with two conflicting theories for the proper
analysis of this case. Confusingly, although the theories are
conceptually quite different, they are both properly referred to
as constructive trusts. The legal constructive trust theory
urged by the Grantees allows for the enforcement; in certain
circumstances, of an express trust that would otherwise be
unenforceable. By contrast, the Siblings' equitable constructive
trust approach does not enforce an otherwise unenforceable
express trust, but rather creates and imposes a trust in equity
to avoid the unjust enrichment of one who has committed some
wrongful act. The district court accepted the Siblings1 theory
of the case and ruled accordingly. We disagree, and hold that,
because the Siblings' claim for relief ultimately relies on a
purported unwritten express trust created by Arnold, the
Grantees' theory is the proper approach under the circumstances
of this case.
fl4 The law relating to the creation and enforcement of express
trusts is well settled and imposes various rules intended largely
to protect the sanctity of property rights and the written
instruments transferring those rights. See, e.g., Jewell v.
Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, 597 (1961) (imposing clear
and convincing evidence standard upon the attempted "overthrow of
a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered"). An
express trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intent to
create it and subjecting the person in whom title is vested to
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of others."
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added).
Thus, when an express trust is claimed to have been created
through an inter vivos transfer, the expressed intention of the
grantor is perhaps the central element in the claim.
fll5 Further, when no written instrument evidences a trust
involving real property, the trust is enforceable only in limited
circumstances. See id. (adopting section 45 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1957)
(stating circumstances under which an otherwise unenforceable
express trust may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries). One
circumstance under which an unwritten land trust may be enforced
is when the grantor and grantee of the real property were, at the
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time of the transfer, in a confidential relationship.6 Thus, the
Grantees argue, a legal constructive trust may be imposed only
upon evidence of Arnold's intent to create a trust as well as a
confidential relationship between Arnold and the Grantees.
116 The Sibl ings argue, and the district court accepted, that an
equitable constructive trust is an available remedy in this case.
"Courts recognize a constructive trust as a matter of equity
where there has been (1) a wrongful act, (2) unjust enrichment,
and (3) specific property that can be traced to the wrongful
behavior." Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, f 34, 164 P. 3d
353. "Such trusts are usually imposed where injustice would
result if a party were able to keep money or property that
rightfully belonged to another." Id. "To establish a wrongful
act under Utah law, an entity must have obviously received funds
by mistake or participated in active or egregious misconduct."
Id. fl 35; see, e.g., In Re Unicom Computer Corp., 13 F.3d 321,
322 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a case where a creditor mistakenly
transferred money to a debtor); Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jolley, 24
Utah 2d 187, 467 P.2d 984, 984 (1970) (involving a constructive
trust that was placed on a third person after she was given a
stolen automobile).
fl7 The problem with the application of the Siblings' approach
to the circumstances of this case is that the only wrongful act
alleged by the Siblings is the Grantees' failure to comply with
Arnold's expressed intentions at the time of the transfer. If
Arnold did not have and express an intent that the 1967 deed
transfer the farm property to the Grantees in trust, then the
Grantees taking of the farm property in fee simple under the
express language of the deed cannot be deemed wrongful.
Conversely, in order for the Grantees' conduct to have been
wrongful, Arnold would have needed to express his intent to
transfer the farm property into trust--i.e., Arnold would have
had to have attempted to create an express trust. Thus, the very
circumstances that might entitle the Siblings to equitable relief
trigger the application of the various legal rules governing the
creation and enforcement of express trusts.
1f 18 The Siblings seek to use the law of equitable constructive
trusts as a substitute for the law governing the enforcement of
express trusts. As well-intentioned as the district court's
application of equitable principles in this case may have been,
the practical effect of allowing the sort of equitable concerns
3. The other circumstances described in section 45 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts have not been raised in this
matter.
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presented in this case to trump written deeds would be that "no
person could longer rest in the security of his title to
property, however solemn might be the instrument on which it was
founded." Jewell, 366 P.2d at 598 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The law governing the enforcement of express trusts is
clear and must be applied even when it produces results that,
under a pure fairness standard, might arguably be deemed
inequitable. Cf. Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151 (holding that where an
oral express trust exists, section 45 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts is "controlling").
fl9 In sum, there are only two possible ways of characterizing
the Grantees' actions in this case. They either acted in
violation of Arnoldfs expressed intent, implicating the law of
express trusts and their enforcement by constructive trust, or
they committed no wrongful act at all. Either possibility is
fatal to the imposition of a trust under the Siblings' equitable
constructive trust theory, which is premised on avoiding unjust
enrichment. We thus determine that the district court erred when
it imposed a trust under the Siblings' theory. Although this
determination necessitates our reversal of the district court's
judgment in the Siblings' favor, questions remain as to whether
the matter can be concluded in either party's favor as a matter
of law or whether it must be remanded for further proceedings.
To answer these questions, we turn to the Grantees1 evidentiary
arguments.
B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

^[20 Having accepted the Grantees' application of the law of
express trusts as the proper approach for evaluating this case,
we examine the particular elements urged by the Grantees and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support those elements. It is
somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be asked to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to support findings that
were not actually made by a trial court. Ordinarily, when the
district court applies the wrong legal standard the matter is
reversed and remanded so that the district court may consider the
evidence under the proper standard. Here, however, the Grantees
ask us to simply reverse the district court without remand,
arguing that the evidence presented can only lead to a finding of
no enforceable trust as a matter of law.
f21 We agree with the Grantees that there is no enforceable
unwritten express trust in this case, although we do so based on
the district court's findings rather than on our own evaluation
of the evidence presented below. After a four-day trial on the
issue of Arnold's intent at the time of the 1967 deed, the
district court made extensive factual findings about the
circumstances surrounding Arnold's execution of the deed. One of
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these findings was that "Arnold did not consider the conveyance
to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the [farm]."
^[22 This finding of Arnold's lack of intent is necessarily
incompatible with the definition of an express trust, which
requires the grantor's "manifestation of intent to create it.11
See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987). An inter
vivos trust can be created in these circumstances only by a
grantor's intent to transfer property into trust. Cf. Legcrroan
v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93, 232 P.2d 746, 748
(1951) (n[T]he test for determining whether a writing has
effected a trust or is testamentary in character is whether the
maker intended the instrument to have any effect until after his
death, or whether he intended to transfer some present interest.
If, therefore, the father intended to pass legal title to the
son, as trustee, . . . then the transaction was a valid trust."
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, as
found by the district court, Arnold did not intend to transfer
the farm at all, and we can thus conclude only that he did not
intend to transfer the farm into trust. Without Arnold's intent
to transfer the farm into trust, there can be no express trust to
enforce, directly or by imposition of a legal constructive trust,
and the Grantees were entitled to judgment establishing their
ownership of the farm under the express terms of Arnold's
"clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered." See
Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, 597 (1961).4
f23 Under these circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that
there can be no express trust in favor of the Siblings.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment on the
trust issue and remand this matter for entry of judgment
establishing fee simple ownership of the farm in the Grantees.
II.

The District Court's Sanctions Order

^[24 The Grantees also challenge the district court's order
imposing sanctions against them for failing to use good faith in
participating in court-ordered mediation. We agree with the
Grantees that such sanctions are inappropriate under the
circumstances.
f25 The Siblings sought sanctions against the Grantees after an
unsuccessful court-ordered mediation session. According to the
Siblings' motion in the district court, the Grantees informed the
4. In light of the effect of the district court's finding that
Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm, we need not address
the question of whether the evidence could demonstrate a
confidential relationship between Arnold and the Grantees^
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Siblings prior to mediation that the Grantees did not want to
participate in mediation and did not intend to make any proposals
or consider any settlement offers in the mediation. The Siblings
also asserted that " [a]t the June 27, 2006 mediation, [the
Grantees] informed the mediator that they would neither make any
offer nor consider any offer that he might present to them, and
that they would refuse to attempt to resolve this case other than
to let the matter go to trial." The district court found that
the Grantees "came to the mediation with a fully formed intention
not to participate in the mediation in good faith and had
determined that they would not be prepared to discuss all
relevant issues in this case" and awarded sanctions against the
Grantees.
\2S
Mediation proceedings are governed by rule 101 of the Utah
Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution. See Utah
R. Ct. ADR 101. Rule 101(c) mandates that lf [a] 11 parties shall
be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the
authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case." Id.
R. 101(c). However, " [t]he parties may terminate the proceedings
at any time." Id. R. 101(g). The rule further contemplates the
circumstances under which sanctions may be imposed against a
party: "Upon written recommendation by the mediator or motion by
any party, the court may order absent parties to show cause why
they failed to attend the mediation conference and, if
appropriate, why sanctions should not be imposed." Id. R. 101(h)
(emphasis added).
^27 Here, it is undisputed that the Grantees attended the
mediation conference. However, the district court concluded that
the Granteesf actions at and prior to the conference violated
rule 101(c). Interpreting that rule, the district court stated
that it "requires good faith discussion, and while parties may
terminate that process, they may only do so after they have
engaged in the settlement process in good faith." This
interpretation is flatly contradicted by language elsewhere in
the rule, which clearly states that "parties may terminate the
proceedings at any time." See Utah R. Ct. ADR 101(g) (emphasis
added). The rule also contemplates sanctions only when a party
fails to attend a mediation conference, not when a party's
actions at the conference fail to lead to a settlement. See id.
R. 101(h); cf. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quashing sanctions order where the "basis
for sanctions [was] merely that defendants were unwilling to make
an offer of settlement satisfactory to [plaintiff]"). Finally,
we disagree with the district court that the Grantees acted in
bad faith or violated rule 101(c). It appears that they merely
held a firm belief, vindicated by our decision today, in the
validity of their claims such that they had no interest in a
compromised settlement. Promptly informing the other parties and
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the mediator of this fact served to avoid unnecessary time and
resources spent in unproductive mediation efforts and cannot be
viewed as evidence of bad faith under the circumstances so longas the Grantees otherwise complied with the terms of the rule.
^|28 For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in
sanctioning the Grantees for their actions at and leading up to
the court-ordered mediation conference. Accordingly, we also
reverse the order awarding sanctions and direct that all parties
bear their own costs and fees arising from the failed mediation.
CONCLUSION
f29 We determine that the district court erred in finding that a
purely equitable constructive trust can arise under the
circumstances presented in this case. Rather, the only potential
relief available to the Siblings is the enforcement, by means of
a constructive trust, of an alleged unwritten express trust. We
have determined, however, that an express trust can only exist in
this case if Arnold intended to transfer the farm into trust and
that the district court's finding that Arnold did not intend to
transfer the farm at all precludes an express trust from arising
in this case as a matter of law.6 Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's judgment on the trust issue and remand this
matter for entry of judgment in the Grantees' favor.
1f3 0 We also reverse the district court's order awarding
sanctions against the Grantees for failing to engage in good
faith participation in court-ordered mediation. Rule 101 of the
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution
implicitly contemplates sanctions against parties solely for
failing to appear at a mediation conference, and explicitly
guarantees the rights of parties to terminate the proceedings at
any time. For these reasons, we hold that the district court's

5. We also note that our decision today is consistent with the
high degree of confidentiality afforded to the mediation process.
See, e.g., Reese v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, ^ 8, 177 P.3d 605
(expressing the policy that mediation communications "be
protected from postmediation disclosure").
6. To the extent that the district court's finding of Arnold's
intent potentially affects the validity of the deed itself or
requires further findings about the farm's ownership or chain of
title, such matters exceed the scope of today's decision, and we
express no opinion thereon.
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imposition of sanctions against the Grantees was improper under
the circumstances.
K31

Reversed and remanded.

y
William A. T h o m e Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

\Z2

WE CONCUR:

P^lrr'T^ d r e e n ^ a ^ ^ A ^
Presiding Judge

Gregory^ K. Orme, Judge

20070797-CA

12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of December, 2008, a true
and correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited m the
United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be
delivered to:
M DAYLE JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 N 100 E
PO BOX 888
PROVO UT 84603-0888
M DAVID ECKERSLEY
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 E 400 S
CITY CENTER I STE 900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4111
THOMAS W SEILER
ROBINSON SEILER & ANDERSON LC
2500 N UNIVERSITY AVE
PO BOX 1266
PROVO UT 84603-1266
HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
125 N 100 W
PROVO UT 8 4 601
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
ATTN: JENNIFER / RAELENE
125 N 100 W
PROVO UT 84601

Ju&*6ial Secretary
TRIAL COURT: FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, 9704002 60
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20070797-CA

